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随着买家回归,瑞士医疗科技企业暂缓资本支出

简而言之: 当瑞士医疗科技企业的所有者在销售额持续增长的同时暂停投资时,买家会将这部分推迟的资本支出计入交易价格中,因此,尽早为出售做准备的所有者便能避免因暂停投资而造成的价值损失。

一个既能实现销售额增长又能控制资本支出的行业

《瑞士医疗技术产业研究》第十版, 由《Swiss Medtech》与赫尔布林集团于2026年9月10日联合发布, 于2026年3月至5月期间对601家企业进行了调查。从表面数据来看,该行业发展态势良好,相关并购市场也呈现活跃态势:2025年,医疗技术领域的并购(M&A)活动再次回升。该行业的销售额达到 2025年将达到260亿瑞士法郎,过去两年年均增长5.5%,这一增速约为瑞士经济增速的两倍。出口额约为120亿瑞士法郎,该行业对国家贸易顺差的贡献位居第三,达55亿瑞士法郎。企业仍将约12%的营收投入研发(R&D)。

从那条线以下来看,资本决策的走向恰恰相反。 43%的企业计划不进行投资,这是该调查有史以来的最高比例,因为 联邦中小企业门户网站指出,这是自2018年以来的最高纪录. 将投资重点放在生产上的企业占比下降了5个百分点,将投资重点放在研发上的企业占比则下降了7个百分点。 两年间净就业人数仅增加了约200人,而此前十年间年均增幅约为1,500人;生产领域的计划招聘人数下降了11个百分点。超过半数(53%)的受访者认为瑞士作为投资地的竞争力较五年前有所下降,且认为竞争力恶化的人数是认为有所改善的人数的3倍。

该研究按优先顺序列出了原因:瑞士法郎走强(43%的企业)、贸易协定和关税(38%)、工资成本(37%)以及官僚主义(35%)。 与此相对的是,政治稳定和法律确定性(62%)以及技术工人供应(34%)。企业主向调查人员表示,他们仍然相信市场,并已停止在国内扩大产能。

Indicator,瑞士医疗技术公司 值 买家会从中解读出什么
2023年至2025年的销售额增长 每年5.5%(10年平均6.4%) 需求依然稳健;利润率和产能存在风险
计划不进行投资的公司 43%,创下调查纪录 尽职调查团队将作为负债计价的递延资本支出(capex)
2024年至2025年新增就业岗位净数 约200(过去十年的年均值约为1,500) 增长主要由现有团队推动;关键人员集中度上升
该地点的评分比五年前更低 53%的企业 布局和生产转移计划纳入投资方案
仅在瑞士生产的产品制造商 略多于三分之一(供应商占62%) 供应商层级最易受到瑞士法郎汇率和关税利润率压力的影响
2025年医疗科技交易分析 50起,其中15起涉及金融投资者 经历了两年相对低迷的时期后,市场活动有所回升;私营资本已成为常规交易对手方

来源:Swiss Medtech 和 Helbling,《2026 年瑞士医疗技术行业研究报告》(样本量 n = 601,调查时间为 2026 年 3 月至 5 月),主报告及法语版数据简报。解读专栏:Neumarz。

为何冻结资本支出预算是一项估值决策

企业主通常将暂停投资视为一种审慎之举:持有现金,等待瑞士法郎汇率和关税形势趋于稳定。但在交易中,这种做法会被解读为另一种含义。 买方在评估盈利质量时,会将资本支出调整至企业维持营收所需的水平,而该水平与实际支出之间的差距,则会被视为类似债务的调整项或价格减项。 因此,两年间推迟的生产和研发投资,在交易交割时可能会重新体现为股权价值的减项。

同样的逻辑也适用于人员。一个在两年内销售额增长了26亿瑞士法郎、同时净增约200个岗位的行业,却要求现有的工程师、质量和合规人员来支撑这一增长。对于收购方而言,这增加了留任条款、关键人员条款以及与交易完成后员工留任挂钩的对价比例的重要性。

该条例存放在同一个文件夹中。由于 2021年5月26日,根据欧盟《医疗器械法规》(MDR),瑞士制造商被视为第三国。,这需要指定一名欧盟授权代表并调整标签。证书体系、与指定机构的关系以及维持这两者有效所需的成本,是任何瑞士医疗科技目标企业尽职调查中的标准项目;而一家已暂停投资的公司,其证书续期工作可能也已暂停。

关税波动如今影响着交易结构

美国和德国是该行业的主要贸易伙伴,据该报告显示,仅美国一国就占贸易总量的约四分之一。 研究概况. 过去十二个月的关税走势异常波动。2025年夏季,瑞士商品面临39%的关税,随后根据 2025年11月初步协议. 该 2026年2月21日,美国最高法院裁定根据《国际紧急经济权力法》(IEEPA)征收的关税违法。, 随后实施了为期150天的10%统一关税和 自2026年7月24日起 a 12.5% Section 301 duty applies to Switzerland, among 60 economies. A Section 232 investigation into medical devices, opened in September 2025, remains open.

For valuation, the rate itself matters less than its instability. A buyer underwriting a Swiss exporter with a large US book will model several tariff cases and will ask who carries the downside. That is where earn-outs and deferred consideration, analysed in the Neumarz note on how deal structure absorbed the 2026 negotiation, become practical tools: they let a seller keep the upside of a tariff settlement while the buyer pays for it only once it materialises.

The Buyers Are Already in the Room

The study reports that medtech M&A picked up again in 2025 after two restrained years, and that 15 of the 50 transactions analysed involved financial investors. Broader Swiss data points the same way. Deloitte counted 208 Swiss SME transactions in 2025, up 16%, with private equity deals up 45% to 116; life sciences and healthcare accounted for 16% of domestic and inbound deals, with inbound deals more than doubling while domestic deals fell. PwC found private equity or venture capital participation in 60% of Swiss health industries deals in 2025.

Two recent Swiss transactions show the two shapes the market is taking. Ypsomed, which chose to become a pure-play self-injection specialist, sold its diabetes care business to TecMed AG, controlled by Willy Michel, for up to CHF 420 million including an earn-out, announced in April 2025 and completed on 4 August 2025: a carve-out that separated two capital needs, with part of the price tied to future performance. At the other end of the scale, Stryker signed a definitive agreement on 31 August 2026 to acquire ZuriMED, the Zurich-based spin-off of ETH Zurich, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, behind the FiberLocker rotator cuff system, which had raised a CHF 14.5 million Series A in 2023. In both cases the next investment cycle moves to a new owner, the same choice an owner who has paused investment eventually faces: fund the next cycle, or hand it to a buyer.

The structure of the industry explains the appetite. 95% of the roughly 1,400 companies are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while the largest 5% employ half of the workforce. That is a classic buy-and-build landscape: specialised suppliers and niche manufacturers with certified products, a reputation for quality and an owner who has chosen to stop funding the next capacity step alone. For a platform investor or a foreign strategic, a Swiss company that has paused investment is often cheaper to buy now than after the owner has spent two more years waiting.

The study also identifies where future value sits. Half of companies already use artificial intelligence (AI) in business processes, and AI’s share of R&D budgets is expected to rise from 13% to 24% by 2030, while digital skills remain scarce in Switzerland and teams are being placed abroad. An acquirer that brings a digital and regulatory platform to a strong product company solves a problem the seller lacks the means to solve, and that is the strongest argument for a premium.

What Owners and Acquirers Should Prepare Now

Owners have four preparations. Document the investment pause as a decision with a plan, including the capex the business needs to sustain its revenue, so that a buyer prices a schedule with the gap already explained. Map the certificate estate, the EU authorised representative arrangements and the renewal calendar before anyone asks for them. Build the US exposure into scenarios at 12.5% and at higher Section 232 cases, and decide in advance which part of the price can be tied to a tariff outcome. Secure the people who carried two years of growth with retention terms that survive a change of control.

Acquirers have three. Screen the supplier tier first, where 62% still manufacture only in Switzerland and franc and tariff pressure land hardest on margins. Underwrite deferred capex at the indicative-offer stage and put the proposed treatment in the letter, so the price holds through the data room. Bring the digital and regulatory capability the target lacks as part of the offer, because more than 80% of companies in the survey still expect higher growth in 2026 and 2027, and the gap between that expectation and their own capacity to fund it is where a transaction creates value.

Neumarz,一家隶属于Kainjoo SA的企业,, runs buy-side and sell-side mandates for Swiss and European mid-market companies, including regulated industries such as medical technology. The work covers capex normalisation before a process opens, structuring of tariff and regulatory risk into deferred consideration, and access to the private credit 和 specialist cross-border capital that now finances these deals.


This article is general commentary prepared for professional and qualified contacts. It does not constitute an offer, a solicitation, investment advice or a personal recommendation within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA), and it is not a substitute for advice on your own circumstances. Mandate-specific information is available only under a non-disclosure agreement (NDA).

参考资料

  1. Swiss Medtech and Helbling. “Swiss Medical Technology Industry Sector Study 2026,” report, August 2026. swiss-medtech.ch
  2. Swiss Medtech. “Étude 2026 sur le secteur des technologies médicales,” 10 September 2026. swiss-medtech.ch
  3. Swiss Medtech. “Étude 2026, chiffres et faits clés,” fact sheet. swiss-medtech.ch
  4. SECO, KMU-Portal. “La medtech enregistre de bons résultats, mais recrute peu et investit moins.” kmu.admin.ch
  5. Swiss Medtech. “US Tariffs.” swiss-medtech.ch
  6. economiesuisse. “New US tariffs of 12.5 percent announced,” 3 June 2026. economiesuisse.ch
  7. Reuters via KELO. “Swiss to ease recognition of US standards for cars, medical devices as trade deal sought,” 30 June 2026. kelo.com
  8. MME. “Medical Devices: Necessary Update of the Agreement with the EU,” 18 August 2021. mme.ch
  9. Deloitte. “M&A-Aktivität der Schweizer KMU 2026,” 11 February 2026. deloitte.com
  10. PwC Switzerland. “Swiss M&A Trends in Health Industries: 2026 Outlook,” 9 February 2026. pwc.ch
  11. Ypsomed. “Ypsomed sells its diabetes care business to TecMed AG to become a pure-play self-injection specialist,” 22 April 2025. ypsomed.com
  12. Ypsomed. “Ypsomed completes the sale of Ypsomed Diabetes Care to TecMed AG,” 4 August 2025. ypsomed.com
  13. Stryker. “Stryker signs definitive agreement to acquire ZuriMED to enhance its shoulder offering,” 31 August 2026. investors.stryker.com
  14. ZuriMED. “ZuriMED to be acquired by Stryker.” zurimed.com

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(j) Allegory Capital 可能会投资于没有运营历史的实体,这使得对这些实体的评估变得复 杂,并且

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