Kurz gesagt: A headline enterprise value is rarely the number a seller collects at closing. Between the multiple applied to EBITDA and the wire that actually lands is the equity bridge, and inside that bridge sits a category of liabilities, deferred revenue, pension shortfalls, factoring balances, unfunded capex, earn-outs, tax accruals, that never appear as “debt” on a balance sheet yet cut equity value on a dollar-for-dollar basis once a buyer classifies them as debt-like. In one illustrative $45 million transaction modeled by RSM US LLP, reclassifying accounts payable, accrued liabilities and half of deferred revenue as debt-like items dropped the seller’s final cash settlement from $42.7 million to $35.1 million, a swing of nearly 17 percent with no change to the headline price. That is the case for treating debt-like items as a first-order diligence workstream rather than a late-stage argument.
The Number Nobody Actually Banks
Private M&A pricing is usually anchored to enterprise value: an EBITDA multiple applied to the operating business, independent of how that business happens to be financed. But enterprise value is a valuation concept, not a settlement instruction. The amount that changes hands is equity value, and the path from one to the other is what practitioners call the enterprise-to-equity value bridge: add back cash, subtract debt, subtract debt-like items, and adjust for the gap between working capital delivered at closing and the working capital target, or peg, agreed in the purchase agreement. Grant Thornton’s own worked example shows a €40 million enterprise value settling at €32 million of equity value once cash, debt and a working capital shortfall are applied, an eight-million-euro gap the headline number never hinted at. That gap is exactly where negotiating leverage lives for the remainder of the deal, and it is why sophisticated counterparties treat the bridge, not the multiple, as the real point of contention.
Cash-Free, Debt-Free: A Convention, Not a Guarantee
Most deals are structured on a cash-free, debt-free basis, meaning the seller keeps historical cash and is responsible for extinguishing funded liabilities before control changes hands. The convention exists because EBITDA-based valuation already excludes interest expense and non-operating assets, so both sides implicitly price the business as though it carries no debt and needs no seller cash to run. Funded debt itself is rarely contentious: bank loans, lines of credit and shareholder notes sit visibly on the balance sheet. The dispute begins with everything the balance sheet does not label as debt but that behaves like debt once the buyer takes over, and it is compounded by the fact that most letters of intent never actually define the term.
Where Debt Ends and “Debt-Like” Begins
Grant Thornton’s transaction advisory practice sorts these liabilities into three bands. Bank loans, related-party loans, finance leases and corporation tax are almost always treated as debt outright. Factoring balances, change-of-control costs, deferred consideration and pension deficits are usually treated as debt-like, because each represents a financing arrangement or an obligation the seller’s earnings never actually funded. A third band, deferred revenue, unpaid bonuses, underspent capex and legal claims, is genuinely contested and depends on the specific facts of the business. Grant Thornton flags deferred income as the single most debated adjustment in its own transaction data, precisely because technology and subscription businesses collect cash long before they deliver the service that cash was paid for.
The Line Items Deal Teams Fight Over
RSM US LLP’s transaction advisory group catalogues the recurring candidates in granular detail. Deferred revenue draws buyer scrutiny because the seller banks the cash while the buyer inherits the cost of fulfilling the obligation. Earn-outs owed on a prior acquisition are frequently pulled into the debt-like bucket because the seller’s adjusted EBITDA already reflects the full pro forma earnings tied to that acquisition, so leaving the remaining liability out of the bridge would let the buyer pay for the same earnings twice. Unfunded or frozen pension obligations are treated the same way, as are factoring balances, since both represent financing substitutes rather than ordinary trade credit. Payables tied to capital expenditure, and payables extended well past normal vendor terms, are flagged for the same reason: they quietly fund the business the way a credit line would. Tax liabilities occupy their own category entirely, since accrued income tax, sales and use tax, and unclaimed funds all represent obligations the seller incurred but the buyer would otherwise have to settle out of pocket after closing.
The table below reproduces the structure of RSM’s illustrative settlement on a $45 million deal, showing how far a purchase price can travel once these items are actually classified rather than left as an assumption in the letter of intent.
| Adjustment applied | Narrow debt definition | Broad debt-like definition |
|---|---|---|
| Purchase price | $45,000k | $45,000k |
| Interest-bearing debt excluded | ($3,272k) | ($3,272k) |
| Accounts payable and accruals classified debt-like | $0 | ($5,272k) |
| Deferred revenue at 50 percent | $0 | ($1,634k) |
| Final cash settlement | $42,661k | $35,141k |
Why Classification Moves the Price, Not Just the Paperwork
The incentive on each side is structural, not personal. Buyers push liabilities out of the working capital pool and into the debt-like category because a debt-like classification is deducted from equity value immediately and in full, while a working capital shortfall only bites if closing capital falls below the agreed peg. Sellers argue the opposite direction for the same reason: keep the liability inside working capital, and it may never cost anything at all. Neither position is unreasonable in isolation. What makes the outcome material is that these arguments are almost always had after the letter of intent is signed, when negotiating leverage has already shifted toward the party that can credibly threaten delay, and when a quality-of-earnings report has already anchored both sides to a set of adjusted EBITDA figures neither wants to revisit.
Defending the Bridge
The commercial fix is procedural: define debt and debt-like items, and the working capital peg alongside them, before diligence begins rather than after a quality-of-earnings report surfaces a dispute. That means aligning the accounting workstream with the drafting of the purchase agreement so definitions are precise enough to survive a closing dispute, not just a term sheet conversation, and it means treating the bridge as a negotiated deliverable rather than an afterthought to the multiple. Neumarz advises both buy-side and sell-side clients on exactly this discipline: pressure-testing the equity bridge line by line, challenging every proposed reclassification against its economic substance, so the enterprise value a client negotiates is the equity value a client actually realizes at closing.
Referenzen
- Kreischer Miller, “Understanding the Importance of Debt and Debt-Like Items in an M&A Transaction,” https://www.kmco.com/insights/understanding-the-importance-of-debt-and-debt-like-items-in-an-ma-transaction/
- Grant Thornton Belgium, “The Impact of Debt and Debt-Like Items on the Transaction Price,” https://www.grantthornton.be/en/the-field/articles-and-publications/impact-of-debts/
- RSM US LLP, “Issues in Negotiating Cash-Free Debt-Free Deals,” https://rsmus.com/content/dam/rsm/insights/services/mergers-and-acquisition/1pdf/whitepaper_transaction_advisory_cash_free_debt-free.pdf
