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A Weaker Dollar Keeps US Buyers Out of Swiss SME Deals

TLDR: A weaker dollar has already halved American buying of Swiss companies, and the midterm outlook extends that trend, so Swiss sellers should build their sale around European buyers whose debt is still repricing.

The Midterm Result Points to Higher US Yields and a Softer Dollar

The Democratic Party won both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 3 November 2026 midterm elections, by a wider margin than expected. In a market note to private clients the following day, BNP Paribas Banque Privée1 read the result as a likely turn in US fiscal policy: a Democratic majority could favour a more expansionary budget, which could push the 10-year US Treasury yield above 5% and reinforce the scenario of a gradual depreciation of the dollar. The same note expects investment in artificial intelligence (AI) to hold up in the short term, since a presidential veto would likely block legislation hostile to the sector.

Most commentary will read that scenario through equity indices. For a Swiss business owner preparing a sale, the useful question sits elsewhere: which buyers can afford a Swiss company priced in francs, and in which currency do they borrow to pay for it. The answer was already visible in last year’s deal data.

The Dollar Already Halved the American Share of Swiss SME Buyers

Deloitte’s annual study of Swiss small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) transactions counted 208 deals in 2025, of which a record 104 were acquisitions by foreign buyers. Within that inbound flow, the share of buyers from the United States fell from 17% to 8%2. Deloitte attributes the drop to the weaker dollar against the franc and to US tariff policy, which made Swiss acquisitions dearer and less predictable for American bidders. European buyers filled the gap: French acquirers became the largest foreign group for the first time at 27%, German buyers took 19%, and Europe as a whole accounted for more than 80% of inbound deals.

Buyer origin Share of 2025 inbound deals
France 27%
Germany 19%
Nordic countries 13%
United States 8% (17% a year earlier)
Europe, all countries Above 80%

Exhibit 1. Foreign acquirers of Swiss SMEs by origin, 2025, out of 104 inbound transactions. Source: Deloitte Switzerland, M&A activity of Swiss SMEs 2026.

A Swiss company is priced in francs; an American fund raises and reports in dollars. When the dollar falls 10% against the franc, the same franc price costs the American bidder about 11% more dollars (1 ÷ 0.9), before a single turn of leverage enters the model. A US fund holding its return target constant recovers that gap with a lower franc offer, and a lower offer loses the auction to a European bidder for whom the currency effect is absent. If BNP’s scenario of a gradually weaker dollar plays out, the currency headwind that cut the American share in 2025 stays in place through 2027.

Higher Treasury Yields Raise the Bar a Second Time

The fiscal half of the scenario adds a second cost. A 10-year Treasury yield above 5% lifts the risk-free rate in every US acquisition model, and with it the return a fund demands from a foreign deal. The US Federal Reserve already raised its target range to 3.75% to 4.00% on 16 September 20263, and the ICE BofA US investment-grade corporate spread4 widened from 0.82% on 8 October to 0.93% on 3 November.

Together the two forces make a Swiss target dearer in dollars and the dollar itself dearer to borrow. For a seller, the consequence is direct: a sale process that budgets for American bidders to return in 2027 is budgeting against both the currency and the rate outlook.

The European Buyers Who Replaced Them Borrow in a Market Still Repricing

The buyer pool that carries Swiss SME exits is now overwhelmingly European, and much of it is sponsor-backed: private equity took part in 116 of the 208 Swiss SME deals in 20255. Those buyers finance in euros, and the euro leveraged-finance market has kept moving since the October analysis of how the autumn repricing hit the highest bidders. The ICE BofA Euro High Yield effective yield6 stood at 5.46% on 14 August, 6.52% on 8 October and 6.69% on 3 November 2026. Its option-adjusted spread7 widened from 2.54% to 3.26% and then to 3.56% on 2 November.

Indicator 14 Aug 8 Oct Early Nov
Euro high-yield yield 5.46% 6.52% 6.69%
Euro high-yield spread 2.54% 3.26% 3.56%
US investment-grade spread 0.80% 0.82% 0.93%
Swiss National Bank policy rate 0% 0% 0%

Exhibit 2. Cost of acquisition money, August to November 2026. Early November = 3 November for yields and the US spread, 2 November for the euro spread. Sources: ICE Bank of America indices via Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED); Swiss National Bank.

Private credit, the other main source of acquisition debt, has tightened on structure as much as on price. Octus data on European mid-market direct lending show average margins rising to 553 basis points in the second quarter of 2026 and average leverage falling to 3.8x8, down from a peak of 4.3x in the third quarter of 2024. Less debt per franc of earnings means a larger equity cheque for the same price, and a larger equity cheque means a lower return for the fund. The European sponsor who replaced the American one in 2025 now faces the same squeeze on price, by a different route.

A Weaker Dollar Opens a Window for Swiss Acquirers in the United States

The same scenario reads in reverse for a Swiss group looking west. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) held its policy rate at 0% on 24 September 20269, against 2.50% at the European Central Bank and 3.75% to 4.00% at the Federal Reserve, so a franc-funded acquirer borrows off the lowest of the three reference rates. A softer dollar lowers the franc price of every American target, and a higher Treasury yield thins the field of leveraged US bidders competing for the same companies. For a Swiss industrial or family-owned group with an unlevered balance sheet, the conditions that keep American funds out of Switzerland are the conditions that favour a Swiss bid in the United States.

The currency hedge belongs in the first financing model, because a dollar asset funded with franc debt carries a mismatch that reverses if the dollar recovers. The tariff exposure of the target belongs in due diligence, since Deloitte cites US tariff policy as a deterrent in the opposite direction and the same policy shapes a US target’s margins. And the timing belongs to the calendar: the SNB’s next monetary assessment falls on 10 December 202610, and a hedge priced before that date carries less uncertainty than one priced after.

Neumarz Tests Every Cross-Border Bid on Currency Before Price

In Neumarz’s sell-side practice, a foreign bid is read in the bidder’s own currency before it is compared in francs, because that is where a headline can move between the indicative offer and signing. Exhibit 3 shows the arithmetic for a US fund that sized its dollar budget on a CHF 50 million price: the same dollars buy less of the company each time the dollar slides.

Dollar move vs franc Extra dollars for the same price Franc offer at an unchanged dollar budget
Unchanged 0% CHF 50.0m
-5% +5.3% CHF 47.5m
-10% +11.1% CHF 45.0m
-15% +17.6% CHF 42.5m

Exhibit 3. A dollar-funded bid for a company priced at CHF 50 million, before any change in leverage or return target. Source: Neumarz calculation, illustrative.

The practice that follows from the table is a short list of questions put to every foreign bidder at the indicative stage, alongside the price itself. In which currency is the bid funded, and is the exposure hedged through closing? Which lender backs the debt, and on what date was it priced? How much covenant headroom remains at today’s spreads rather than August’s? Is the price fixed in francs, or does any mechanism let currency moves flow back to the seller? A bidder who answers all four with documents has turned a headline into a commitment. The answers also rank the field: a lower franc offer from a funded, hedged European buyer can outlast a higher dollar-funded offer that has yet to price its own currency risk.

What Sellers and Acquirers Do Before the December Decisions

Owners preparing a sale in the next twelve to eighteen months can plan around the buyers who actually transact. That means a buyer universe built first on French, German, Nordic and Swiss acquirers, with American bidders included where a strategic fit justifies the currency cost. The four questions above, asked at the indicative stage, identify early any offer modelled on August conditions. For many of the 90,667 Swiss SMEs awaiting a successor, the sale proceeds are the owner’s retirement capital, and a bid that holds through confirmatory due diligence is worth more than a higher headline that moves.

Swiss acquirers can use the next six weeks to build a US target list and price the hedge, while leveraged American competition recalculates its own cost of money. A committed franc offer with a tested currency plan is the clearest advantage a Swiss buyer brings to a US process this winter.

Neumarz, a Kainjoo SA venture, runs sell-side and buy-side mandates across the Swiss, European and US mid-market, building buyer universes around the bidders who can fund a deal today and cross-border acquisition plans with currency, funding and structure tested before the first approach. Owners and acquirers can request a confidential review of their buyer map or target list ahead of the December rate decisions.

This article has been reviewed by Haider Alleg, Managing Partner at Neumarz, a Kainjoo SA venture.

This article is general commentary prepared for professional and qualified contacts. It is general information within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA), separate from any offer, solicitation, investment advice or personal recommendation, and advice on individual circumstances remains a matter for a dedicated mandate. The currency arithmetic is illustrative, and the US fiscal and currency outlook cited is a scenario from a third-party bank note. Mandate-specific information is shared under a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) only.

References

  1. BNP Paribas Banque Privée. “Flash marchés – Midterms américains : les leçons de la « vague bleue »,” client market note, 4 November 2026 (distributed by email to private-banking clients; no public URL).
  2. Deloitte Switzerland. “M&A activity of Swiss SMEs 2026,” press release. https://www.deloitte.com/ch/en/about/press-room/m-and-a-activity-of-swiss-sme-2026.html
  3. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. “Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement,” 16 September 2026. https://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm
  4. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). ICE BofA US Corporate Index Option-Adjusted Spread (BAMLC0A0CM). https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/BAMLC0A0CM
  5. KMU-Portal, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). “Strong increase in mergers and acquisitions,” 4 March 2026. https://www.kmu.admin.ch/kmu/en/home/new/news/2026/strong-increase-mergers-acquisitions.html
  6. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). ICE BofA Euro High Yield Index Effective Yield (BAMLHE00EHYIEY). https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/BAMLHE00EHYIEY
  7. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). ICE BofA Euro High Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread (BAMLHE00EHYIOAS). https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/BAMLHE00EHYIOAS
  8. Octus. “Data Drop: European mid-market margins edge up despite increasing lender competition.” https://octus.com/resources/blog/data-drop-european-mid-market-margins-edge-up-despite-increasing-lender-competition/
  9. Swiss National Bank. “Monetary policy assessment of 24 September 2026.” https://www.snb.ch/en/publications/communication/press-releases-restricted/pre_20260924
  10. Swiss National Bank. Media events schedule. https://www.snb.ch/en/ifor/media/id/media_events

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